Whether Shamefacedness Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is
proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is
clear from the definition of virtue given in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence,
since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part
of justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of
fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and
aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from
something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is
about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is
the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness,
a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the
support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices
are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate
prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to _Ethic._
ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from
many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is
a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.
_I answer that,_ Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and
in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in
_Phys._ vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with
perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue.
Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the
fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of
a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult
good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating
of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does
not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as
being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a
virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way
shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a
praiseworthy passion.
Reply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of
virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's
definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an
elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and
disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of
intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness
pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of
its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the
species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the
vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which
is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
honesty.
Reply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow
that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every
vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
Reply Obj. 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an
acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man
would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of
shamefacedness.
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