Whether Man Is More Shamefaced of Those Who Are More Closely
Connected with Him?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those
who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in _Rhet._
ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the
better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man
is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
him.
Obj. 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who
perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to
_Rhet._ ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does
himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most
closely connected with him.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take
more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as
jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected
with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take
shame chiefly from them.
Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first
time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less
closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by
those who are more closely united to him.
_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."
_I answer that,_ Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the
excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of
which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect,
especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a
person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he make
another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered
as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or
because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's
attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of
his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man
is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a
greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire
no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on
account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because "everyone
judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we
are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us,
since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers
and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do,
inspire us with no shame at all.
An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more
desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are
more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some
harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons
connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be
continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual
harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby
ceases almost at once.
Reply Obj. 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same
reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just
as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they
have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments
hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom
we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in
detail.
Reply Obj. 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected
with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they
look upon our defect as disgraceful.
Reply Obj. 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm
they do by making many think ill of us.
Reply Obj. 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us
more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition
seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in
one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more
disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom
we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be,
is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our
request, or by failing to become their friends.
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