Whether Cowardice* Is a Greater Vice Than Intemperance?
[*Cf. Q. 125]
Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to
the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a
more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141,
A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains."
Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
passions; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, that "it is more
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is
overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
overcome by fear.
Obj. 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires
to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death,
which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous
sin than intemperance.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice."
Therefore it is more sinful.
_I answer that,_ one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death,
to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving
life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire
of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because,
as stated above (A. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain
annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures.
Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin.
Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the
part of the object or motive matter.
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the
more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who
are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of
death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive
of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the
graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than
cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions
done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external
agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are
simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an
intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary
generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is
enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man.
Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell
on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in
matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that
imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside
his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more
voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is
more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes
place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply
more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it
is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are
of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas
dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for
man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
Reply Obj. 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with
temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard
to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is
directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this
point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance,
since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common
good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more
difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any
pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for
cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a
greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the
other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser
vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater
vice.
Reply Obj. 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one
shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures
whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of
life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of
death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex:
although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow,
and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.
Reply Obj. 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a
general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases
we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
_______________________