Whether Intemperance Is the Most Disgraceful of Sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the
most disgraceful of sins.
Obj. 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly
less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of
intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected
with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin.
Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and
intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not
the most disgraceful of sins.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."
_I answer that,_ Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory.
Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1), and
glory denotes clarity (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance
is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most
repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to
us and the lower animals, as stated above (Q. 141, AA. 2, 3).
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
like to them." Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's
clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
being most slavish.
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12] "the sins of the
flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although
less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability
is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace
regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of
the sin in respect of the sinner.
Reply Obj. 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and
disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the
nature of the vices themselves.
Reply Obj. 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we
mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are
connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode
of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices
are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of
excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in
committing the unnatural vice.
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