Whether Intemperance Is a Childish Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin.
For Jerome in commenting on Matt. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and
become as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger,
is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful
woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore
intemperance is not a childish sin.
Obj. 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in
respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.
Obj. 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas
concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned,
are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5,
"Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .
concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth,
fornication . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we
apply the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*_Akolasia_ which
Aristotle refers to _kolazo_ to punish, so that its original sense
would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be childish for two reasons.
First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does
not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense.
Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of
intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is
one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three
ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child
concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human
affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason.
Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness
is twofold," that "the beautiful is that which is in keeping with
man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals."
Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like
manner "concupiscence does not listen to reason," according to
_Ethic._ vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a
child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a
child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too,
concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine
says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not
resisted became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is
applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence
it is written (Prov. 23:13, 14): "Withhold not correction from a
child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from
Hell." In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it
according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he
says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual
things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e.
carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually
weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not
wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it." Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live
according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible
to accord with reason."
Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting
what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of
intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First,
with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are
about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex,
which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire
may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that
nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not
happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no
sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity
[*Cf. Q. 167], such as the nice (_curiosa_) preparation of food, or
the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these
things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason
given above.
Reply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason
in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
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