THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace?

Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without

grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it

possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more

reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of

evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and

without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that

"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they

love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without

the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to

be truly patient.

Obj. 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more

abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some

heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than

betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be

truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have

patience without the help of grace.

Obj. 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much

trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the

health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health.

Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure

many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly

patient.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from

God, "is my patience."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength

of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly

undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which

gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of

themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose

to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end.

Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing

to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the

privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the

fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the

loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which

loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a

virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is

patient."

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through

grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in

our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is

clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature

in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of

concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is

more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the

concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the

sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason:

and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is

commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can

tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without

the help of God's grace [*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand,

the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto

by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man

bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man

naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between

this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 827 / 1128 题