SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 2]

Whether Patience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues.

For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now

"patience hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the

greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the

soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written

(Luke 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls."

Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of

other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom.

xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the

virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

_On the contrary,_ It is not reckoned among the four virtues which

Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call

principal.

_I answer that,_ Virtues by their very nature are directed to good.

For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the

latter's work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's

superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater

according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly.

Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more

directly to good than those which are a check on the things which

lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective

of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good

(thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and

justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw

man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a

greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is

fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is

concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship,

which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the

greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological

virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in

good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from

greater obstacles to good.

Reply Obj. 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing

hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by

patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness;

thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust

injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle

is the most perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,

that it is more perfect simply.

Reply Obj. 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man

is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by

the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the

soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all

the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but

merely because it removes their obstacles.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 826 / 1128 题