Whether Magnanimity Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For
no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher
states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs
to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to
any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to
the magnanimous man. For it is stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3 that "it
belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of
prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that
he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he
gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he
is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not
given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore
magnanimity is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul,
according to the saying of Isa. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the
garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride
adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the
virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general
virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it
from the other virtues.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2), it belongs to a
special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate
matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a
determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and
honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly
magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.
Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above
(Q. 103, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it
regards all the virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great
honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a
great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on
doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to
what is worthy of great honors.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows
that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence,
and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a
man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself
ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other
virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man
thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their
sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again,
all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be
the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes
a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external
evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids
under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his
excellence or greatness.
Reply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster
or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment
results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through
magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in _Ethic._
iv, 3.
_______________________