Whether Magnanimity Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every
moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean
but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself
worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity
is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have a virtue without having
magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
"whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of
them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity
is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated
above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). But magnanimity implies certain
dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of
"a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his
utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems
himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to
_Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Obj. 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But
magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the
first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is
remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q. 113]
towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others;
fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those
that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc.
15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the
greatness of courage (_animi magnitudinem_) with which they fought
for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now,
only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity
which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
_I answer that,_ The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding
the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.
Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others,
as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 11, A. 2, Obj. 3). Therefore
magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a
virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the
magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he
tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he
follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according
to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth"
(Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
Reply Obj. 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to
their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts
of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming
to every virtuous man, but only to great men. On the other hand, as
regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all
virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in
the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto.
Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not
competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed
to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his
state.
Reply Obj. 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according
to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it
happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by
way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man
being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish,
whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few
and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.
Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who
are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the
magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these
dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man
according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are
naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found
naturally.
Reply Obj. 4: There is in man something great which he possesses
through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him
through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man
deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he
holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue,
magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same
is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or
external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think
little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and
magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from
God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do
anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and
esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's
gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In
his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is
brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the
contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,"
which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore
evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one
another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because
they proceed according to different considerations.
Reply Obj. 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a
magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in
the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful
of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact
that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he
repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of
gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the
acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he
is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what
becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of
works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is
also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to
truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not
true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he
does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number
of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards
persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle
class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with
others: this means that he is not at home with others than his
friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which
belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great
and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also
said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any,
but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to
the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to
supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
_______________________