Whether Magnanimity Is a Part of Fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be
the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If
magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou
shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a
man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far
removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of
fortitude.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
magnanimous man is not _philokindynos_, that is, a lover of danger.
But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore
magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a
part thereof.
Obj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped
for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or
dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is
a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part
thereof.
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon
magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a principal
virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of
virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue
is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every
virtue," according to _Ethic._ ii. And this is chiefly commended in
those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most
difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to
stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the
virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the
greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as
man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of
death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity
agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult
matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind
about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity
is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as
secondary to principal.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), "to lack evil
is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous
evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were
the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and
the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity
may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference
as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it
follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to
all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks
"many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a
magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for
the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that
are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to
danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even
as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not _mikrokindynos_, i.e.
endangering himself for small things, but _megalokindynos_, i.e.
endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat.
Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers
like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes
the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
Reply Obj. 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to
withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer
an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be
desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to
wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires
it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than
that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things
is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good
things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue
of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil,
evil is of more import in this particular respect.
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