Whether Magnanimity Is Essentially About Great Honors?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great
honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated
above (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore
it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
Obj. 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness
about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either
great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to
magnanimity to be about great honor.
Obj. 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is
dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor,
and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is
not only about great honors.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
magnanimity is about great honors.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18),
virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the
perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that
power, as stated in _De Coelo_ i, 116. Now the perfection of a power
is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such
operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however
imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it
is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as
stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3.
Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act
of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the
point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and
establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this
difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also
of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which
may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which
moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards
chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions,
because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv,
4).
Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness
of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases
from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are
the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great
power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive
appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to
reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions
regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is
about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence
of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest
anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of
resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that
are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of
money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not
only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also
about that which is ordinary or little: because things external,
though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for
human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two
virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely
liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely
"magnificence."
In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
which are _philotimia_, i.e. love of honor, and _aphilotimia_, i.e.
without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving
honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as
both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great
honors there is _magnanimity._ Wherefore we must conclude that the
proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous
man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.
Reply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in
itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason,
the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is
much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.
Reply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest
presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any
need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are
things existing outside the soul.
Reply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more
able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous
man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even
little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot
sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence
he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them
above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are
ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor,
but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.
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