Whether Magnanimity Is About Honors?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For
magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows,
since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes
the irascible part, as appears from _De Anima_ iii, 42, where the
Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and
mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a
concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it
seems that magnanimity is not about honors.
Obj. 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs
be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about
operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows
that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore
magnanimity is not about honors.
Obj. 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit
rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he
tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring
honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about
honors.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
"magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."
_I answer that,_ Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching
forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to
two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its
activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use
of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly
from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is
minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two
ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may
be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of
some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good
use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists
in the best use of the greatest thing.
The things which come into man's use are external things, and among
these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin
to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated
above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to God and to the
best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid
shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be
magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and
simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that
are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about
honors.
Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the
concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is
added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity
regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something
great or difficult.
Reply Obj. 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation,
yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a
difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the
passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope:
even so, we have stated (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude
that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of
fear and daring.
Reply Obj. 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a
way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too
great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so
as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving
of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a
man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think
much of the honor accorded by man.
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