Whether Fortitude Deals Chiefly with Sudden Occurrences?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with
sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when
they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that
"fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil."
Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not
unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures
beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so
as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say
afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly
happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the
case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is
not concerned with sudden happenings.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave
man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future, which is
inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of
fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that
"fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."
_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the operation of
fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not
about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think
beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to
Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes with
less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we
are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to
be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of
the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden
occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the
habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a
habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without
forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges
on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that
habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.
Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude,
to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same
way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
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