Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For
"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x,
4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after
the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his
act.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of
the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are
called "fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure
delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he
takes pleasure in his act.
Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the
brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own
body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight
in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently
the brave man does all things with pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the
brave man seems to have no delight in his act."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we
were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily,
resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from
an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results
from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason.
Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain
things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance,
the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a
natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and
things connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in
respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave
man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as
regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end
thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual
sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence
we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in
body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I
fear Thee."
Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the
spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's
grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things
in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the
Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said
that he felt as though he were walking on roses.
Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely
overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes
spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the
life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for
a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices
for him not to be sad."
Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power
hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses
hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper
operation.
Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of
their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is
principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen
in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."
Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the
delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the
sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that
spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in
the presence of great bodily pain.
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