Whether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his
action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that
which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as
to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher
says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does
not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not
employ anger for his action.
Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he
should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more
imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of
fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira
i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for
action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than
for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid,
the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?"
Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.
Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of
fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or
desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild
beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and
adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now
fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore
in like manner it should not employ anger.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger
helps the brave."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning
anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion
between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded
anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or
good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief,
ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the
soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in
reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of passions to all the
movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport
themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command
of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt,
they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the
other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of
reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to
certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they
called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them
altogether from virtue.
Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but
not immoderate anger.
Reply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is
subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will,
which would not be the case were it immoderate.
Reply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its
assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an
instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it
unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal
agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover,
Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed
by him directly at Aristotle.
Reply Obj. 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), has two
acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the
act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but
for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the
other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of
sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking.
On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing
that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as
being the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as
making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from
sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a
pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand
danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far
as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which
fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is
brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose,"
i.e. for a due end; "this is true fortitude."
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