Whether Fortitude Is Only About Dangers of Death?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of
death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is
love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved":
and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the love which dreads no
hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude is not only about
danger of death, but also about other afflictions.
Obj. 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a
mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a
mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also
about other fears.
Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is
about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of
death.
_On the contrary,_ Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the
irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of
reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold
firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no
bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude
of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of
reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm
against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less
things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of
virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful
of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is
shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body
be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and
destroyed." Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of
dangers of death.
Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of
adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any
kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest
evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a
restricted sense.
Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates
the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of
contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money,
as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is
the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own
life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue
modifying the fear of death.
Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right
reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with
reason is not contrary to virtue.
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