Whether Fortitude Is About Fear and Daring?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring.
For Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to
overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts
of the present life." Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures
rather than about fear and daring.
Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to
fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has
nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a
man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not
about fear and daring.
Obj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on
passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more
than about hope.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that
fortitude is about fear and daring.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from
following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult
belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil
that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in
the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of
difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the
reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of
these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to
withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them
altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which
seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is
about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just
man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all
mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted,
and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special
virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of
an eternal reward."
Reply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the
course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear.
Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but
mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those
passions.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for
hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same
object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fortitude properly
regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as
appears from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it
follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not
about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2).
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