Whether Fortitude Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it
is written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude."
Since then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that
fortitude is a general virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not
lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues
and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on
all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled
against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a
deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the same further on in
connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special
virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from
firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in
_Ethic._ ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other
virtues.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term
"fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a
certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue,
or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly
and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness
only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most
difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore
Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate facing of
dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fortitude is reckoned a
special virtue, because it has a special matter.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word
virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power
is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another
sense is a principle of action, as stated in _Metaph._ v, 17. And
since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as
denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for
virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby
one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the
first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special
virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against
all kinds of assaults.
Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting
firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even
as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the
assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are
most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those
which are less difficult.
Reply Obj. 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.
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