Whether Covetousness Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is
called _philargyria_, applies not only to silver or money, but also
to anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin there is
immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away
from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a
general sin.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous
(_avarus_) man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass (_avidus
aeris_)," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called
_philargyria_, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which stands for
money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be
measured by money, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore
covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently
seems to be a general sin.
Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known
concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now the law seems to forbid
especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written
(Ex. 20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Therefore
the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is
a general sin.
_On the contrary,_ Covetousness is numbered together with other
special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all
iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
_I answer that,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good
towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a
special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind
of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful
good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since
they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man.
Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an
immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the
name of money, whence covetousness (_avaritia_) is denominated.
Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been
originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are
absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said
to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in _De
Praedicamentis_), consequently the term "covetousness" has been
amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything
whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that
"covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge
and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after." In
this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense
Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First
Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses
of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they
have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods
that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire
for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it
is a special vice.
Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for
anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is
forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to
covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
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