FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 1]

Whether Covetousness Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For

covetousness (_avaritia_) denotes a certain greed for gold (_aeris

aviditas_),* because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money,

under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for

covetousness _avaritia_ is derived from _aveo_ to desire; but the

Greek _philargyria_ signifies literally "love of money": and it is to

this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2, Obj. 2)]. Now it is not a

sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both

because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means

man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his

substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor,

or oneself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 4). But covetousness is

not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed

neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is

directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this

pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1

Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own

body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's

neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.

Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now

covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,

according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness

is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be

without covetousness, contented with such things as you have."

_I answer that,_ In whatever things good consists in a due measure,

evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that

measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in

a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be

commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate

with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External

goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated

above (Q. 117, A. 3; I-II, Q. 2, A. 1). Hence it must needs be that

man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other

words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have

external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in

keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for

him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them

immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined

as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that

covetousness is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means

to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is

held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But

covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external

things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the

acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires

or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly

against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external

riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot

be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify

immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches

when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in

them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against

himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in

his body as do the sins of the flesh.

As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all

mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of

temporal things.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to

reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though

old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as

everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are

not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with

regard to riches.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 734 / 1128 题