Whether Covetousness Is Opposed to Liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
For Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that
there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special,
to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
Obj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
justice and not to liberality.
Obj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7;
iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not
opposed to liberality.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall
not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no
fruits from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it
inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in
the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
_I answer that,_ Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to
riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition
and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his
due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to
justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27):
"Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to
shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness."
Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for
riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or
takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In
this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these
affections, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 3; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6).
In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): "That they
would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as
a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they
should regret what they had given, and give but little."
Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of
covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is
called illiberality [*_aneleutheria_] by the Philosopher.
Reply Obj. 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure
in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of
legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's
property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally
in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking
and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as
these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from
the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which
latter depends on the rule of reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite
vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to
justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and
this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to
liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
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