Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Thanks to Every Benefactor?
Objection 1: It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every
benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm
himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to
whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since
thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore
thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.
Obj. 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But
some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and
grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a
benefactor.
Obj. 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own
profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.
Therefore thanks are not due to them.
Obj. 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is
belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his
master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor.
Obj. 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably
and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is
very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid
for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the
benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would
not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be
a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man
is not always bound to repayment for favors received.
Obj. 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is
inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that
repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person
repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give
thanks."
_I answer that,_ Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself
because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be
directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a
benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural
order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying
the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And,
as stated above with regard to a father (Q. 31, A. 3; Q. 101, A. 2),
a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the
latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally
he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.
Reply Obj. 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is
liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who
forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by
his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor
on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves
him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable."
Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for
gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing
except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken
of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to
oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11),
in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as
though they were various persons.
Reply Obj. 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good
rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as
he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that
reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the
favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for,
as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay
discounts a favor."
Reply Obj. 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much
whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours,
or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and
benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a
man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done
it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am
ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was
profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of
malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has
been the loser thereby."
Reply Obj. 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does
what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service:
when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as
soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that
be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude
is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.
Reply Obj. 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what
he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the
deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says
(De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun
to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should
be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but
everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may
be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him
reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want
should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi):
"There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we
happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable
and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no
need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor
before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi),
"it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no
favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made
you his debtor!"
If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he
should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue
if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart
has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as
heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness
he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 3).
Reply Obj. 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor
depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment
should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If,
however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental
to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca
observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep
back and safeguard my repayment."
_______________________