Whether the Innocent Is More Bound to Give Thanks to God Than the
Penitent?
Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks
to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received
from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of
innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it
seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
penitent.
Obj. 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes
him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing
his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to
his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had
less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn
to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as
much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered
from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been
from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is
also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
Obj. 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the
greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is
more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine
says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy,
that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I
ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not
have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both
what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance
committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks
than the penitent.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 7:43): "To whom more is
forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he
loveth less' Luke 7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound
to greater thanksgiving.
_I answer that,_ Thanksgiving (_gratiarum actio_) in the recipient
corresponds to the favor (_gratia_) of the giver: so that when there
is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on
the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed
_gratis:_ wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater
on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and
in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he
receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more
continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be
said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in
this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the
innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously
given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received
grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is,
considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent
is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a
poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And
since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to
take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such
absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of
the voluntary and the involuntary.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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