Whether Observance Is a Greater Virtue Than Piety?
Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.
For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a
father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular
governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the
state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is
greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance
is a greater virtue than piety.
Obj. 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the
common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we
ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy
to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common
good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in
positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays
worship to one's kindred.
Obj. 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the
first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the
virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3).
Therefore observance takes the first place after religion.
_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue.
Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the
first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers
to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the
order of excellence.
_I answer that,_ Something may be paid to persons in positions of
dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when
one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state.
This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays
worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland.
Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity
refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this
belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in
comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration
the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves,
which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the
persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin
to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and
education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's
substance than external government, the principle of which is seated
in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes
precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more
akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.
Reply Obj. 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to
a particular power, as regards external government, but not as
regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way
the father should be compared with the divine power from which all
things derive their being.
Reply Obj. 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are
related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to
observance, but to piety, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be
proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered
in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore,
though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of
honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a
greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received
from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay
worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are
not of their kindred.
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