Whether the Essence of Theft Consists in Taking Another's Thing
Secretly?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take
another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not,
apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends
to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as
indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Isa. 3:9):
"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not
hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should
consist in taking another's thing secretly.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A. 2, Obj. 3,
Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist.
xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to
refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore
just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist
in keeping it back.
Obj. 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that
which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with
another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it
is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's
thing secretly.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "_Fur_ (thief) is derived
from _furvus_ and so from _fuscus_ (dark), because he takes advantage
of the night."
_I answer that,_ Three things combine together to constitute theft.
The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives
to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take
possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as
distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such
as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be
about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as
a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or
as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his
daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft.
The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and
consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it
belongs properly to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing
secretly."
Reply Obj. 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man
employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and
guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a
species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is
merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both
because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
Reply Obj. 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same
kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust
detention is included in an unjust taking.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person
simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit
belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is
the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply,
but as regards its custody.
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