Whether the Sin of Respect of Persons Takes Place in Judicial
Sentences?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does
not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is
opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (A. 1): whereas
judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice.
Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial
sentences.
Obj. 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now
it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a
heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a
prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore
respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be
merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the
person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of
persons is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to
accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the
person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 60, A. 1), judgment is an act of
justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice,
those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of
persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is
allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the
equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment
is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
Reply Obj. 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view
of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to
commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by
judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and
how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him.
Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as
much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and
gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this
way respect of persons may take place in any judgment.
Reply Obj. 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a
crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of
persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case,
a diversity of things, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 10, ad 3; Q. 61, A.
2, ad 3).
Reply Obj. 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy
as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying
of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in
judgment."
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