Whether It Is Unlawful to Form a Judgment from Suspicions?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion
about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that
suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible
to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars.
Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about
singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be
lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.
Obj. 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a
man's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the
injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not
unlawful.
Obj. 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an
injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A.
1). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus,
as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Therefore a judgment based on
suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss
of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before
the time." Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to
be unlawful.
_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] in comment on
the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part
on mere suspicion."
_I answer that,_ As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion
denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to
three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this
very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to
think evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he
walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men
fools." Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards
another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with
or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of
him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this
is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
13) that "old people are very suspicious, for they have often
experienced the faults of others." The first two causes of suspicion
evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third
diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to
certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently
suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes,
the more vicious it is.
Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a
man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications.
This is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation
without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss
on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." The second degree is when
a man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as
certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since
it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss
goes on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are
human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from
forming a definite and fixed opinion." The third degree is when a
judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains
directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not
indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the
matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
witnesses.
Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another
without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does
him an injury.
Reply Obj. 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
operations, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 8, 10, 11; Q. 59, A. 1, ad
3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it
is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
anger to murder.
_______________________