SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Judge?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished

except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with

punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Matt.

7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is

unlawful to judge.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that

judgest another man's servant[?] To his own lord he standeth or

falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it

lawful to judge.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 John 1:8, "If we

say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful

for a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable,

O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest

another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which

thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint

judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the

people with just judgment."

_I answer that,_ Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of

justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A. 1, ad 1,

3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of

justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice;

secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it

be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one

of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First,

when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is

called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about

matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by

usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man,

without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden

matter, and then it is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash"

judgment.

Reply Obj. 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is

about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine

states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment

about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe,

since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on

Matt. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in

the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], He

forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from

bitterness of heart.

Reply Obj. 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is

written (Deut. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on

(Deut. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not

judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom

[*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all

does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an

occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they

are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the

judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove

or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.

in Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as

another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to

strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting

thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned

once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be

equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 411 / 1128 题