Whether Judgment Is an Act of Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what
he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive
faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence.
Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which
is in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4).
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man
judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue
of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost
Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity
rather than to justice.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its
proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in
everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore
judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
virtues.
Obj. 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But
the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then
judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the
proper act of justice.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be
turned into judgment."
_I answer that,_ Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as
such. Now a judge (_judex_) is so called because he asserts the right
(_jus dicens_) and right is the object of justice, as stated above
(Q. 57, A. 1). Consequently the original meaning of the word
"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to
decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about
matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a
right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For
this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have
recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice."
Reply Obj. 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a
right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a
right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a
right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is
an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or
define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which
depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of
justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of
fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act
of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of
prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore
_synesis_ which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as
stated above (Q. 51, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity,
has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the
Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces
judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces
judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling
of the law.
Reply Obj. 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas
justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q.
58, A. 2). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in
matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are
in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a
virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained
above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for
the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and to put
his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more
specifically to justice than to any other virtue.
Reply Obj. 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q.
58, A. 6], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in
the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence
judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to
justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.
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