THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]

Whether We Can Suffer Injustice Willingly?

Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly.

For injustice is inequality, as stated above (A. 2). Now a man by

injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.

Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another.

But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily.

Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be

inflicted by himself.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for

having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished

according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable

burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man

can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a

man suffers injustice voluntarily.

Obj. 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers

that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one

who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it

is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice

voluntarily.

_On the contrary,_ To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are

contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore

on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.

_I answer that,_ Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,

whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in

the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in

_Phys._ iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is

the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does

voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he

suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a

principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather

than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly

speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an

injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so

to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to

be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally),

or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to

another more than he owes him).

Reply Obj. 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he

does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a

man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if

he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by

another's action.

Reply Obj. 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways.

First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on

himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,

intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because

injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.

Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the

State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and

image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to

himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in

accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle

declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man

violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."

Reply Obj. 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now

in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is

that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above

(A. 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of

the will of agent and patient, as stated above (A. 2).

Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and

injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the

material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an

injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other

man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and

on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an

injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury

unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 407 / 1128 题