Whether Whoever Does an Injustice Sins Mortally?
Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice
sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is
sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they
do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter."
Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
Obj. 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs
but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and
should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an
injustice sins mortally.
Obj. 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter
Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto
that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the
other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin
to do an injustice.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q.
64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 5), when we were
treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is
contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury
inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which
moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always
consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that
to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls
"ignorance of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which
deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not
excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no
injustice except accidentally, as stated above (A. 2)
Reply Obj. 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls
short of the perfection of an unjust deed, in so far as what he does
may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter
is not hurt or displeased.
Reply Obj. 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues
are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
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