Whether a Man Is Called Unjust Through Doing an Unjust Thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing
an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of justice is the
just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a
man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust
through doing an unjust thing.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not
be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is
unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he
does an unjust thing.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper
act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does
what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may
do an unjust thing without being unjust."
_I answer that,_ Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to
him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of
its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may
happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not
unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the
operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species
and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in
things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and
the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that
which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for
instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is
unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but
only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is
unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly,
this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the
operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a
passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice,
for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's
complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a
habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit
is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust
intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which
sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man
may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without
having the habit of injustice.
Reply Obj. 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and
formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from
choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the
sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
Reply Obj. 3: The object of temperance is not something established
externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance,
i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man
himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be
said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner
neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is
dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is
similarity in all respects.
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