SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7]

Whether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a

general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as

neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man

sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is

no need for a particular justice.

Obj. 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to

"one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in

matters relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA. 5, 6).

Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man

to another in matters relating to the individual.

Obj. 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands

the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general

justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the

individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice

directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not

the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a

legal justice.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom in his commentary on Matt. 5:6,

"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom.

xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or

the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), legal justice is not

essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which

directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other

virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular

goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another

individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice

there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to

himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal

justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his

relations to other individuals.

Reply Obj. 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in

his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so

immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so

mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a

man immediately to the good of another individual.

Reply Obj. 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of

the individual differ not only in respect of the _many_ and the

_few,_ but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the _common_

good differs from the aspect of the _individual_ good, even as the

aspect of _whole_ differs from that of _part._ Wherefore the

Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that

the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and

not specifically."

Reply Obj. 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher

(Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely

"of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of

which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between

such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice,

viz. _domestic_ justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 6.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 398 / 1128 题