Whether Particular Justice Has a Special Matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special
matter. Because a gloss on Gen. 2:14, "The fourth river is
Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated
through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the
parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a
special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special
power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul
has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.
temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the
fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore
particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no
special matter.
Obj. 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating
to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters
relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and
not special.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular
justice to be specially about those things which belong to social
life.
_I answer that,_ Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of
moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can
rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external
actions, and also those external things of which man can make use.
And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by
means of which men can communicate with one another, that the
relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in
respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in
himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not
about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external
actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in
so far as one man is related to another through them.
Reply Obj. 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part
of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will
which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and
accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not
directly but by a kind of diffusion.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the cardinal
virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each
having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of
virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted:
for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and
avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures,
fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice
is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues,
that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between
one man and another."
Reply Obj. 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral
matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs
to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external
actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently
it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
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