Whether the Right of Nations Is the Same As the Natural Right?
Objection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as
the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is
natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the
jurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the right of
nations is that which is in use among all nations." Therefore the
right of nations is the natural right.
Obj. 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally
slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now "slavery
belongs to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4).
Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.
Obj. 3: Further, right as stated above (A. 2) is divided into natural
and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since
all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement.
Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either
natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right
of nations is distinct from natural right.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the natural right or just is
that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with
another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as
it is considered absolutely: thus a male by [his] very nature is
commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent
is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is
naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is
considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it,
for instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of
land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should
belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in
respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of
the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one
and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).
Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend
a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is
common to us and other animals according to the first kind of
commensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right
in this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says
because "the latter is common to all animals, while the former is
common to men only." On the other hand to consider a thing by
comparing it with what results from it, is proper to reason,
wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason
which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De
Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all men,
is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations." This
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular
man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on
natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful
to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be
helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2).
Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in
the second way, but not in the first.
Reply Obj. 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are
according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality,
it follows that they need no special institution, for they are
instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority
quoted above.
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