Whether Paternal Right and Right of Dominion Should Be Distinguished
As Special Species?
Objection 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of
dominion" should not be distinguished as special species. For it
belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose
states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as
stated above (A. 1). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and
we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as
distinct species.
Obj. 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated
above (A. 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or
kingdom, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), but not to the private
good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no
need for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the
master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in _Polit._
i, 2.
Obj. 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among
men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are
princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to
them.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right
of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil
right.
_I answer that,_ Right or just depends on commensuration with another
person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may
denote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether
distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the
other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and
between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the
"just" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something
else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something
else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his
father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in _Ethic._ viii,
12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument,
as stated in _Polit._ i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]. Hence a father
is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them
there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal."
In like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and
servant, but that which is called "dominative." A wife, though she is
something belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him
as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is
nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his
father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind
of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between
husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave,
because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the
community of the household, as stated in _Polit._ i, 2, 5, it follows
that between them there is "domestic justice" rather than "civic."
Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right,
the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man
gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since
what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the
slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not
justice of father to son, or of master to slave.
Reply Obj. 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as
such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is
something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence
in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in
a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the
relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in
so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of
"right" or "just" is wanting to them.
Reply Obj. 3: All other differences between one person and another in
a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and
to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect
sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished according to
various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial,"
or "priestly" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of
the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or right of
"dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due to each
class of person in respect of his particular office.
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