Whether Imprudence Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For
whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But
imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (A.
1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.
Obj. 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge
is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of
the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be
reckoned among those causes.
Obj. 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances
of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results
from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence;
for instance, reason, intelligence, docility, and so on, as stated
above (QQ. 48, 49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence,
so that it is not a special sin.
_On the contrary,_ Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above
(A. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is
one special vice.
_I answer that,_ A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways;
first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all
sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices,
which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be
general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated
of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as
neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with
special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by
participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just
as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs
them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no
sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason,
which defect belongs to imprudence.
If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in
some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin,
then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in
three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of
prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the
individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above
(Q. 48; Q. 50, A. 7), so also we distinguish various kinds of
imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of
prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the
several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which
_euboulia_ corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of
imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which _synesis_ (judging well
according to common law) and _gnome_ (judging well according to
general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy"
and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act
of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things
which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts
of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the
direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all
the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above.
Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in
"thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable
to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of
shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers generality by participation.
Reply Obj. 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than
prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows
that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on
account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent
result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes
of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a
moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.
Reply Obj. 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the
same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same
species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and
when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are
various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's
property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this
would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were
to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust
of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack
of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute
a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to
different acts of reason, as stated above.
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