Whether Docility Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a
part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every
intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But
docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it
should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our
power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are
praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this
is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it
is not a part of prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since
it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also
called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the
opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1; Q. 47, A. 3) prudence
is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such
matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all
sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of
time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of
being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a
sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less
attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such
persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to
their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into
principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own
prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the
ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from
thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready
to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part
of prudence.
Reply Obj. 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual
virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given
above.
Reply Obj. 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for
other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for
much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must
carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings
of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor
despising them through pride.
Reply Obj. 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but
also for himself, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 12, ad 3). Hence as
stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for
prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should
be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether
self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
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