Whether Understanding* Is a Part of Prudence?
[*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is _nous_]
Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of
prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part
of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding
and prudence, according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Therefore understanding
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q. 8, AA. 1,
8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what
has been said above (Q. 4, A. 8; I-II, Q. 62, A. 2). Therefore
understanding does not pertain to prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic.
vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and
immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not
a part of prudence.
_On the contrary,_ Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i,
8] mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
_I answer that,_ Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual
power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is
taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first
principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds
from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every
process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding.
Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole
process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding.
Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply Obj. 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a
conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated
above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), it applies the knowledge of some universal
principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a
singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must
proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of
universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an
intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative
principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One
should do evil to no man," as shown above (Q. 47, A. 6). The other
understanding, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 11, is cognizant of an
extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical
matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the
syllogism of prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6). Now this
primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place.
Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right
estimate of some particular end.
Reply Obj. 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is
a quick insight into divine things, as shown above (Q. 8, AA. 1, 2).
It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as
stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called
both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and
"sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the
Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we
need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be
understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know
proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a
particular.
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