Whether Memory Is a Part of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For
memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the
sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,
whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part
of prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards
future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated
in _Ethic._ vi, 2, 7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory
among the parts of prudence.
_I answer that,_ Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as
stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now in such like matters a man can be
directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true,
but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles
must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be
concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need
experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual
virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now
experience is the result of many memories as stated in _Metaph._ i,
1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence
memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), prudence applies
universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence
many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for
prudence, and memory is one of them.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while
its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says
in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16, 24], memory not
only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when
a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet
somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us
more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the
mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we
were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these
illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions
easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some
corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on
sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive
part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his
memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may
pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says
(De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to
us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other."
Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to
remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less
it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric
[*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures
of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we
wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that
"reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria
ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing
frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one
thing to another by a kind of natural order.
Reply Obj. 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future
from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to
take good counsel for the future.
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