Whether Prudence Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of
what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with
virtue, as appears in the _Predicaments_ (vi). Therefore prudence is
not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a
virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore
art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written
(2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort
of graving, and to devise ingeniously (_prudenter_) all that there
may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is
immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds
to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 56, A. 1)
when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which
makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may
be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing
that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good,
under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power.
Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without
regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature
of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say,
to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the
aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the
rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because
they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in
other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of
good.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3) to
apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right
appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the
other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues
have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for
any kind of right reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art,
because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in
order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a
virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing
to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a
particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet,
by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in
matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the
uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for
counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as
stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.
Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence
itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on
other things according to prudence.
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