Whether Prudence Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For
no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general,
since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that
follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as
a wise man decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with
prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a
special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the
effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that
of prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue
certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore
prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence
has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action"
(Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore
prudence is not a special virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is distinct from and numbered among the other
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence, justice and fortitude."
_I answer that,_ Since acts and habits take their species from their
objects, as shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2),
any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from
other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good
habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special,
not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather
according to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, Q. 54, A.
2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the
acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to
its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object
is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of
habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect
of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will _a fortiori_
require a difference of habits.
Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as
stated above (A. 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual
virtues by a material difference of objects. _Wisdom,_ _knowledge_
and _understanding_ are about necessary things, whereas _art_ and
_prudence_ are about contingent things, art being concerned with
_things made,_ that is, with things produced in external matter, such
as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with
_things done,_ that is, with things that have their being in the doer
himself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4). On the other hand
prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a
formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power,
wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral
virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue,
distinct from all other virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of
moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an
intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in
common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral
virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the
aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the
virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove
that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus
from containing a species which is operative in every other species
of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.
Reply Obj. 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so
far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:
but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are
the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
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