Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since
envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,
as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 74, A. 4].
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can
be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and
known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and
looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But
envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to _nemesis_, which is a
passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy
is not a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little
one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore
envy is a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For
the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to
the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul
derives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that
we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now
the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is
evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.
Nevertheless, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1),
in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in
the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of
anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are
venial sins.
Reply Obj. 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of
the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the
principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a
mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have
not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
manifest.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is
contrary both to _nemesis_ and to pity, but for different reasons.
For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
contrary to _nemesis_ on the part of the man whose good grieves the
envious man, for _nemesis_ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: "because I had a zeal on occasion of
the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners"], whereas the envious
grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now
pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
contrary to pity and charity.
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