SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 2]

Whether Envy Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to

Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have

companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and

be nettled when they are praised." But no one should be advised to

commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes

praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall

bear rule, the people shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a

sin.

Obj. 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good

zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me

up." Therefore envy is not always a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a

kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul

sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself

shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes

the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,

while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is

gnashing with the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made

desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), envy is sorrow for another's

good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man

grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause harm

either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy,

as stated above (A. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says

(Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without charity being

lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his

glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we

believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we

dread lest many suffer unjustly."

Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it,

but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly

speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this

zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.

14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about

temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may

grieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good

is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by

virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher

states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the

worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow _nemesis_ [*The

nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to

signify "revenge" does not represent the original Greek.], saying

that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he

considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem

great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to

the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are

unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either

for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such

goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are

prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in

Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor

envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2, 3): "My steps

had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw

the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion

of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we

grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this

is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the

Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over

what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.

Reply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to

strive to progress with those who are better than we are.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in

the first sense given above.

Reply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a

certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as

stated above (I-II, Q. 87, A. 2) when we were treating of sins.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 266 / 1128 题