FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]

Whether Envy Is a Kind of Sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the

object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the

envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which

is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind

of sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of

pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says

(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus,

in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy

is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who

are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q.

47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack

little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are

envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy

is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects

have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of

goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II,

Q. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of

envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who

have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we

possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a

species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."

_I answer that,_ The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it

may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and

in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in

two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far

as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man

grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some

harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as

the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).

Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in

so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or

excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good:

and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name

consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the

Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being

reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for

sorrow to be about good, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it

diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man

is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in

reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed

from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors

to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a

commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner

whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far

removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who

are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is

against our will that these should be in better repute than we are,

and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes

pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will.

Reply Obj. 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he

is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in

such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to

him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;

wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation

surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be

honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are

envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may

befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in

something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the

little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those

only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves."

Reply Obj. 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had

them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow;

and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above

all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says

(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much

in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending

little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that

others have acquired goods.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 265 / 1128 题