Whether All Things Desire Peace?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
Obj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the
same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do
not desire peace.
Obj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain
peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt.
10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
Obj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign
good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it
is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command
(Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that "all
things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
_I answer that,_ From the very fact that a man desires a certain
thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in
consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining
it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by
a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are
removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that
whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires
anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance,
to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which
Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."
Reply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or
rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which
consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence
Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of
connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites
proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural
appetites.
Reply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing
but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated
above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter
to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to
break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that
they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence
all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that
which they had heretofore.
Reply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as
the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good
apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can
be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is
truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so
as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many
defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed.
Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace
of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore
it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of
ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."
Reply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true
good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is
a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the
perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires
by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the
rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in
thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this
world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God,
yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the
peace.
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