Whether Peace Is the Same As Concord?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well
ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than
that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace
consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that
peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the
same as concord.
Obj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves
identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace,
viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not the
God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as
concord.
_On the contrary,_ There can be concord in evil between wicked men.
But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. 48:22). Therefore peace
is not the same as concord.
_I answer that,_ Peace includes concord and adds something thereto.
Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace,
wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to
the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to
diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the
diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends
sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite,
according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit."
Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to
diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same
time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the
appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace,
because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he
wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for
him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other
hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord
denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace
denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even
in one man.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is
between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered,
through one man agreeing with another in respect of something
befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not
of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear
of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace,
because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is
disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises
that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in
all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.
Reply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with
another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.
Reply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
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