Whether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without
charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the
naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is
possible without charity.
Obj. 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it
comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,
in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore
true virtue is possible without charity.
Obj. 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._
vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
true virtue can be without charity.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body
to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet
true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no
true virtue is possible without charity.
_I answer that,_ Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things
directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the
end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the
proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and
universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and
principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps.
72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is
ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good
may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it
can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while
the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away
from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true
virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the
disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this
way no true virtue is possible without charity.
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good
is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as
Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser,
whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the
miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through
fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he
curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude,
whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he
goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i,
45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for
instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a
true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final
and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible
without charity.
Reply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one
is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something
that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is
always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
directs it to his unbelief as end.
There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as
stated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is
possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not
perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable
principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or
chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by
charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation
to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life,
as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the comparison fails.
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