SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2]

Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in

the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his

neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love.

Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he

says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was

said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in

the soul, but is God Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the

soul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: "He is thy

life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God

quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity,

according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to

life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.

Obj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the

contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed

it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings

the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not

something created in the soul.

On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By

charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God

for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in

the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.

_I answer that,_ The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q.

17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something

created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the

mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we

love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from

the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous

acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues,

for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and

this he said on account of the excellence of charity.

But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary,

detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind

the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a

way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle

of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive

power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose

principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1):

so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which

involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an

act of the will.

Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will

in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an

instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action,

nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again

the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has

been stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is

the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy

Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should

be the efficient cause of that act.

Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be

connatural to that power by reason of some form which is the

principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to

their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is

inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He

"ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the

act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so

that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power,

inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect

than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it

be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue,

since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity

has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure.

Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of

charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the

natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and

causing it to act with ease and pleasure.

Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is

wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with

the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God

(since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation

of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a

share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love

our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of

speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines

Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to

some an occasion of error.

Reply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by

charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the

life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.

Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is

immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form

depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore

it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an

infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God,

this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of

charity.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 152 / 1128 题