Whether Charity Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity
is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a
virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered
among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore,
is charity a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et
Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies
rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a
virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is
not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the
soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.
Therefore charity is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is
a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us
to God, for by it we love Him."
_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated
by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the
principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of
human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.
human reason and God.
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
right reason," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of
virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to
faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows
that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites
us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that
friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or
with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about
works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect
from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another
person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship
considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of
a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13).
Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of
itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and
virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit,
as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident
from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous,
as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore
friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather
than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it
is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the
goodness of God.
Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to
rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love
is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love.
And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean
that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of
excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider
its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has
its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident
which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its
subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an
accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is
superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher
nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way
charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation
of the Holy Ghost.
_______________________